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Recent Development
No Satisfaction: Mellouli v. Lynch Rejects
Deportation for Hidden Sock Pills
Thai-Binh H. Tran*
On June 1, 2015, the Supreme Court held in Mellouli v. Lynch that a
Kansas drug paraphernalia conviction failed to satisfy federal
requirements for removability. 1 Federal statute permits removal 2 for
any noncitizen violating a law related to a controlled substance as
defined in the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”). 3 The 7–2 decision
applied a strict categorical analysis to compare the Kansas and federal
statutes concerning controlled substances. 4 Justice Ginsburg, writing
for the majority, concluded that state drug paraphernalia crimes must
link with a particular federal drug as defined in the CSA for removal
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 5 Because the Kansas schedules of
* Thai-Binh H. Tran is a Juris Doctorate Candidate, expected to graduate in May 2016 from
Loyola University Chicago School of Law. She thanks Debra G. Gordon, Esq., and Patrick M.
McKenna, Esq., for their inspiring guidance and decisive brilliance in immigration law and
procedure. She also thanks Krishma C. Parsad, Esq., an invaluable mentor and compassionate
advocate. Lastly, she thanks Ben Barnett and Matt Gaspari, Editor in Chief and Editor at Large
for Volume 47 of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, for this opportunity.
1. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1990 (2015). “Removability” is the legal term for the
federal government’s ability to deport a noncitizen. See Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2) (2012) (defining “removable” as “the case of an alien admitted
to the United States” who is “deportable under section 1227 of this title.”). This Recent
Development uses “removability” and “deportability” interchangeably.
2. The United States Constitution provides that immigration law and deportation or removal
actions are the exclusive province of the federal government. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3
(authorizing Congress “to regulate commerce with foreign nations” and among the states); id. § 8,
cl. 4 (empowering Congress “to establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization”); id. § 9, cl. 1
(limiting immigration to persons “proper to admit”).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (“Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted
of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United
States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title
21), . . . is deportable.”). The Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012),
defines “controlled substance” as “a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in
schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of Part B of this subchapter.” § 802(6).
4. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1987 (“The categorical approach has been applied routinely to assess
whether a state drug conviction triggers removal under the immigration statute.”).
5. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1990 (“[T]he Government must connect an element of the alien’s
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controlled substances included nine controlled substances not federally
listed under the CSA, the Court found the Kansas statute categorically
mismatched the federal counterpart, and as such, removal was not
triggered. 6
Yet Mellouli also left several issues unresolved. For example, the
Court declined to address “divisible” state statutes—e.g., a statute with
alternative elements that are divisible into separate crimes. 7 Divisible
statutes permit a “modified” categorical analysis to show which crime
formed the basis of conviction. 8 Moreover, while Mellouli rejected a
drug paraphernalia ruling from the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”), 9 the Court did not apply the BIA’s recent “realistic
probability” test. 10 Under the realistic probability test, a noncitizen’s
drug conviction could still trigger removability if the federally unlisted

conviction to a drug ‘defined in [§ 802].’” (quoting § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i))).
6. Id. at 1984–88. Several recent Supreme Court cases have declined removal for certain drug
crimes. See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) (conviction for possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute is not an aggravated felony); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder,
130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010) (second offense for simple drug possession that is factually distinct from
the first conviction is not an aggravated felony for removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3)); Lopez
v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006) (state felony drug conviction does not thereby make someone
subject to removability, unless the conviction is also punishable as a federal felony).
7. Id. at 1987 n.4 (“Because the Government has not argued that this case falls within the
compass of the modified categorical approach, we need not reach the issue.”).
8. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2286 (2013) (finding that only divisible
statutes warrant a modified categorical approach and defining divisibility in terms of a statute
with “elements” forming alternative crimes (in subsections or a disjunctive list), one of which
does not trigger a federal consequence.). “Elements” are facts necessary for conviction; they
require jury unanimity for a guilty verdict. Id. at 2284, 2286 n.3, 2290, 2296 (Alito, J.,
dissenting). The BIA and federal circuit courts, however, have differed in their interpretation of
Descamps’s divisibility analysis. In Matter of Chairez, the BIA specifically defined divisibility
in terms of jury unanimity, but on October 30, 2015, Attorney General Loretta Lynch issued an
ordering staying Chairez and requesting amicus briefs on the issue of jury unanimity. See Matter
of Chairez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 686 (A.G. 2015). Currently, each federal circuit’s interpretation of
Descamps’s divisibility analysis trumps BIA case law. Matter of Chairez, 26 I.& N. Dec. 478,
481–82 (B.I.A. 2015) (deferring to individual circuits’ interpretations of divisibility under
Descamps). While some circuit courts have followed Chairez’s emphasis on jury unanimity to
prove divisibility, other circuits have differed, holding that statutes are divisible so long as they
contain alternative statutory phrases, regardless of jury unanimity. Compare United States v.
Rendon, 764 F.3d 1077, 1085–86 (9th Cir. 2014) (A statute is indivisible “if the jurors need not
agree on which method of committing the offense the defendant used.”), with United States v.
Yang, 799 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting divisible statutes are ambiguous, containing
imprecise “statutory phrases”), and United States v. Trent, 767 F.3d 1046, 1055 (10th Cir. 2014)
(finding statutes containing alternative statutory phrases to be divisible).
9. Matter of Martinez Espinosa, 25 I. & N. Dec. 118 (B.I.A. 2009), abrogated by Mellouli,
135 S. Ct. 1980.
10. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1988 n.8 (stating that whether the BIA’s Matter of Ferreira, 26 I. &
N. Dec. 415 (B.I.A. 2014), correctly applied the law was “not a matter this case calls upon us to
decide”).
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controlled substances are not realistically prosecuted. 11
Despite these unanswered issues, the decision shows the vital
immigration consequences stemming from statutory interpretation and
categorical matching. 12 Mellouli relied on the “categorical approach” to
assess removability under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”). 13 This approach employs an intricate matching of state and
federal statutes. 14 A noncitizen is removable if the elements of the state
conviction match the INA removal ground. 15 No extra-statutory
evidence or underlying facts may be considered. 16 Instead, the
approach looks to the conviction’s statutory text, and presumes the
conviction rested on the least of the acts criminalized by statute. 17
If a conviction statute is divisible into multiple crimes involving
removable and nonremovable conduct, the court may use a “modified
categorical approach.” 18 The modified categorical approach permits
11. See, e.g., Matter of Chairez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 349, 355–57 (B.I.A. 2014) (explaining that
the noncitizen bears the burden of proving a “realistic probability” that his statute is categorically
overbroad, while the government bears the burden of proving divisibility for modified categorical
analysis); Ferreira, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 419–22 (placing the burden on the alien to show a
“realistic probability” that his conduct would fall outside of the CSA definition to “prevent the
categorical approach from eliminating the immigration consequences for many State drug
offenses, including trafficking crimes”); see also Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1685
(2013) (“[T]here must be ‘a realistic probability,’ not a theoretical possibility” that the state
would prosecute conduct outside the federal definition of a crime.’” (quoting Gonzales v. DuenasAlvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)).
12. See generally CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 1.01–.02 (Matthew Bender & Co. Inc., Rev. Ed. 2014)
(“Part of the complexity of immigration law is mechanical; it lies in the arrangement of
provisions within the many-layered statute, and in the . . . various agencies that share in . . .
administering . . . immigration law.”).
13. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1986–88 (“The categorical approach ‘has a long pedigree in our
Nation’s immigration law.’” (quoting Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1685)).
14. See generally Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions:
Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2011); Jennifer
Lee Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining
the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2012).
15. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1986 (citing Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684–85)).
16. See generally IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 227 (13th
ed. 2012) (explaining how the categorical approach looks solely to the structure of a statute rather
than underlying circumstances).
17. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1986–87 (the categorical approach focuses “on the legal question of
what a conviction necessarily established”); see also Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684 (explaining
that categorical analysis assumes the conviction rested on the least of the acts criminalized). But
see, e.g., Latu v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1070, 1076–80 (9th Cir. 2008) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the use of the categorical approach as “counter-intuitive” where the majority found
that a hit-and-run statute was not a crime of moral turpitude for removability); Mary Holper, The
New Moral Turpitude Test: Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1241, 1301 (2011)
(discussing how some courts have questioned the categorical approach as unduly formulaic
because it requires adjudicators to “put on blinders” as to “what really happened”).
18. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684–85
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examination of limited conviction documents to determine removability
under the INA. 19 In Mellouli, however, because the government did not
argue divisibility, the Court did not apply the modified categorical
approach to Moones Mellouli’s paraphernalia conviction. 20
Mellouli, a Tunisian citizen, entered the United States on a student
visa in 2004. 21 He later adjusted his status to a legal permanent resident
and became engaged to a U.S. citizen. 22 In 2010, Mellouli was arrested
for driving under the influence and for driving with a suspended
license. 23 During a post-arrest search, deputies found four orange
Adderall pills hidden in Mellouli’s sock. 24 Mellouli admitted in an
affidavit that he did not have a prescription for Adderall. 25 The
prosecution charged Mellouli with use of drug paraphernalia—“to-wit:
a sock, to store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise
introduce into the human body a controlled substance.” 26 He pleaded
guilty to misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia in violation of
section 21-5709(b) of Kansas statutes. 27 This Kansas statute does not
identify a particular drug within its text, but rather generally proscribes
“possess[ion] with intent to use any drug paraphernalia to . . . store . . .
or conceal . . . a controlled substance.” 28
In 2012, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement sought to
deport Mellouli under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 29 This section
(explaining that if the statute broadly defines separate crimes without identifying which crime
formed the alien’s conviction, the court may look to the charging document, jury instructions, or
plea agreement for instruction).
19. Permissible documents are those within the “record of conviction,” also called the Taylor–
Shepard documents, which include jury instructions, charging documents, plea agreement, and
transcript of the plea colloquy. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).
20. See supra note 8; Brief for the Respondent at 16–21, Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980
(2015) (No. 13-1034).
21. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1984.
22. Id. at 1985. Mellouli obtained conditional permanent residence in 2009, and the
conditions were lifted 2011. Id. For a general explanation of conditional permanent residence,
see Conditional Permanent Residence, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/after-green-card-granted/conditional-permanent-residence (last
updated Jan. 14, 2011).
23. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1985.
24. Id. Adderall is an amphetamine-based drug listed as a controlled substance under both
federal and state law. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(d)(1) (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4107(d)(1)
(West 2015).
25. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1985. Mellouli’s affidavit would not be a permissible document for
consideration under the modified categorical analysis. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
26. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1985; see also Brief for the Respondent, supra note 21, at 12.
27. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1984.
28. The statute does not identify a specific controlled substance. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 215709(b) (West 2015).
29. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1985.
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permits removal of any noncitizen “convicted of a violation of . . . any
law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country
relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title
21).” 30 An immigration judge ordered deportation, and Mellouli
appealed to the BIA. 31 The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s order
and Mellouli petitioned unsuccessfully for Eighth Circuit review.32
Notably, circuit courts will generally defer to the BIA’s reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous INA provision. 33
In declining review of Mellouli’s case, the Eighth Circuit deferred to
the BIA’s precedential decision on drug paraphernalia, Matter of
Martinez Espinoza. 34 In Martinez Espinoza, the BIA analyzed drug
paraphernalia crimes as being distinct from drug possession crimes.35
The BIA found drug paraphernalia convictions to be deportable
offenses, regardless of their link to federally controlled substances,
because they “relate to” the “drug trade in general.” 36 On the other
hand, in Matter of Paulus, the BIA required state drug possession
crimes to tie directly with federally controlled substances. 37 In Paulus,
the BIA reasoned that the possession offenses at issue referred to a
state’s controlled substances in general but did not connect with
30. 8 U.S.C § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (emphasis added). The INA provides an exception to
removability for a “single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of
marijuana.” Id.
31. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1985.
32. Id. The Attorney General has conferred the BIA with the power to provide, through
precedent decisions, “clear and uniform guidance to the Service, the immigration judges, and the
general public on the proper interpretation and administration of the Act and its implementing
regulations.” 8 C.F.R § 1003.1(d)(1) (2015); see also BD. OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS, PRACTICE
MANUAL ch. 1, at 1–3 (2014) (explaining the policies and functions of the BIA).
33. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(establishing a two-step analysis on whether an entrusted agency interpretation is lawful). Under
Chevron, a court will consider congressional intent, the ambiguity of the statutory language, and
whether the agency adopted a permissible or reasonable interpretation. Id. If the statute is
ambiguous, the court must defer to the agency’s interpretation under the second step as long as it
is a permissible construction of the statute. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n. v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 984–96 (2005) (clarifying that a permissible interpretation need not
be the best interpretation); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226 (2000)
(holding that Chevron deference is proper “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to
the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority”).
34. Mellouli v. Holder, 719 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Mellouli, 135 S.
Ct. 1980; see also Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1985.
35. Matter of Martinez Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec. 118, 120–22 (B.I.A. 2009)
36. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1988 (citing Martinez Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 121).
37. Matter of Paulus, 11 I. & N. Dec. 274 (B.I.A. 1965)); see also Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at
1987–89 (citing Paulus, 11 I. & N. Dec. 274) (explaining that if an alien’s conviction record does
not specify which narcotic was associated therewith, such a conviction for the sale or delivery of
that substance will be insufficient for removal under the INA).
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federally controlled substances. 38 Hence, the BIA imposed stricter
federal correspondence for drug possession crimes than drug
paraphernalia crimes. 39
Considering the BIA’s disparate frameworks, the Eighth Circuit
noted that Paulus was a pre-1970 decision, before most states mapped
their drug schedules according to the federal schedules. 40 Thus, to the
Eighth Circuit, Paulus seemed unpersuasive in the post-1970 era where
Kansas drug schedules aligned nearly perfectly with federal
schedules. 41 The Eighth Circuit instead found there was only a
theoretical (rather than a realistic) probability 42 that a drug offense
would not involve a federal substance. 43 As such, the Eighth Circuit
found Mellouli’s conviction sufficiently related to a CSA controlled
substance under Martinez Espinoza.
Reversing the Eighth Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court held that
Martinez Espinoza made “scant sense” and merited no deference. 44 The
Court found that the decision skirted the INA’s text mandating that the
violation of law “relat[e] to a controlled substance” as defined by the
CSA. 45 Applying Paulus, the Court held that Mellouli’s conviction
required overt relation to a federally controlled substance, rather than a
vague reference to “controlled substances.” 46 Accordingly, the Court
declined removal, overruled Martinez Espinoza, and endorsed Paulus’s
stricter categorical analysis.
The Court also rejected the Government’s broad interpretation of the
38. In Paulus, the BIA specifically stated that the broad California violation could include
peyote, a drug not federally listed as a controlled substance. 11 I. & N. Dec. at 275.
39. Compare Paulus, 11 I. & N. Dec. 274, with Martinez Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 120.
40. Mellouli v. Holder, 719 F.3d 995, 997 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining that in 1970 the states
adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act which was designed to complement the federal
law and “provide an interlocking trellis of federal and state law”) (quoting UNIF. CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES ACT (AMENDED 1994), 9 U.L.A. 5 (1990))).
41. The 8th Circuit stated:
The BIA’s conclusion is a reasonable interpretation of the term ‘‘relating to,’’ a term
that reflects congressional intent to broaden the reach of the removal provision to
include state offenses having ‘‘a logical or causal connection’’ to federal controlled
substances. While the “map” may be imperfect, there is nearly a complete overlap
between the definition of controlled substance in 21 U.S.C. § 802 and in the statutes
of States such as Kansas that adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.
Mellouli, 719 F.3d at 1000 (citation removed).
42. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
43. Mellouli, 719 F.3d at 997.
44. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1989 (2015) (explaining that because the BIA’s
interpretation “makes scant sense” it is owed no deference under the Chevron doctrine); see also
supra note 34 and accompanying text.
45. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
46. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct.. at 1982–88 (“Mellouli’s conviction . . . was not confined to federally
controlled substances . . . as opposed to a substance controlled only under Kansas law.”).
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phrase “relating to” in Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 47 The Government had
argued that such expansive federal language reached state drug offenses
notwithstanding minor variations in state law. 48 At the time of
Mellouli’s arrest only nine out of the 306 controlled substances under
Kansas statutes were not federally listed. 49 Within a year of Mellouli’s
arrest, two of the nine unlisted substances became federally
controlled. 50 The government contended that this significant overlap
satisfied the INA’s “relating to” requirement. 51 The government also
observed that few states actually identify the controlled substance in
their criminal statutes. 52 Hence, requiring the state offense to explicitly
link with a federally listed drug would severely limit the removal
provision. 53 Instead, the government argued that the INA’s broad
“relating to” language permits removal for state drug crimes without
demanding precise correspondence between state and federal law. 54
The Court rejected this “sweeping” interpretation that would allow
deportation for any drug conviction bearing some general relation to a
federally controlled substance. 55 The Court restricted the INA’s
“relating to” language to the parenthetical requiring that the controlled
substance be “defined in” 21 U.S.C. § 802. 56 Such context required the
government to directly link the noncitizen’s conviction with a particular
federally listed drug. 57
Accordingly, the Court held that the
government had not established removability. 58
47. Id. at 1989–90; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 21, at 15–17.
48. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 21, at 15–17. The lower court similarly stated, “[i]f
Congress wanted a one-to-one correspondence between the state laws and the federal [schedules],
it would have used a word like ‘involving’ instead of ‘relating to.’” Mellouli, 719 F.3d at 1000.
49. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 21, at 8. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4105(d)(30)
(West 2010)).
50. Id. at 10.
51. Id. at 6–9.
52. Id. at 31 (arguing that States do not uniformly require identifying the substance to prove a
criminal drug charge.); see also Brief Amici Curiae of the National Immigrant Justice Center &
American Immigration Lawyers Ass’n in Support of Petitioner at 29, Mellouli v. Lynch 135 S.
Ct. 1980 (2015) (No. 13-1034) (finding many states do not identify the substance involved in
paraphernalia crimes).
53. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 21, at 30.
54. Id. at 39.
55. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1990–91 (2015).
56. Id. Many removal provisions of the INA have “relating to” language without a limiting
parenthetical. See infra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
57. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1990 (“Congress and the BIA have long required a direct link
between an alien’s crime of conviction and a particular federally controlled drug.”). A realistic
probability analysis could potentially meet this “direct link” requirement. See supra 11–12, and
accompanying text.
58. The government has the burden to establish removability by clear and convincing
evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012).
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Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, dissented by challenging the
majority’s restrictive view of “relating to.” 59 The dissent argued that
the INA’s statutory scheme supported a broad interpretation of the
phrase. 60 As one example, the dissent offered, an adjacent provision
allows removal for the sale of a weapon “which is a firearm . . . (as
defined in section 921(a) of title 18).” 61 Such syntax suggests that
when Congress requires more specificity for removal, it replaces
“relating to” language with more restrictive language, such as
“involving” or “which is.” 62 The dissent further criticized the
majority’s emphasis on connecting an element of the conviction with a
particular federal drug. 63 Such a view conflates an analysis of the
conviction and its elements, with an analysis of state law and its relation
to federal substances. 64 The dissent concluded that because state drug
schedules often have minor deviations from the federal schedules,
statutes generally referencing a “controlled substance” will now prompt
removal only if the term is divisible into separately listed substances. 65
Mellouli may ultimately lead to the termination of many removal
cases in which the state drug paraphernalia statute refers generally to a
“controlled substance” without naming a specific substance. It is
unclear, however, whether Mellouli’s ruling applies to other INA
provisions containing identical 66 or similar “relating to” language. 67
59. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1991–95 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1992 (explaining that the statute and its provisions indicate “that Congress
understood this phrase to sweep quite broadly”); see also Brief for the Respondent, supra note 21,
at 27–29 (finding that Congress did not use “relating to” in other removal provisions of the INA).
But see Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1988 n.9 (majority opinion) (explaining that the dissent “shrinks to
vanishing point” the language within § 802).
61. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1992 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C)).
62. Id. at 1993 (“[The surrounding provisions] reveal that when Congress wanted to define
with greater specificity the conduct that subjects an alien to removal, it did so by omitting the
expansive phrase ‘relating to.’”). See generally KURZBAN, supra note 17, at 226 (explaining how
the term “involving” suggests necessity while “relating to” suggests the broadest sense).
63. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1993–94 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
64. Id. (contending that the majority did not properly account for the removal provision’s text
due to the fact that “it looks at whether the conviction itself necessarily involved a substance
regulated under federal law” as opposed to “whether the state related to one”).
65. Id. (“For unless the Court ultimately adopts the modified categorical approach for statutes,
like the one at issue here, that define offenses with reference to ‘controlled substances’ generally,
and treats them as divisible by each separately listed substance . . . its interpretation would mean
that no conviction under a controlled-substances regime more expansive than the Federal
Government’s would trigger removal.”).
66. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (containing identical language regarding the
admissibility of a noncitizen into the United States). The noncitizen, however, bears the burden
of proving their admissibility, while the government bears the burden of proving removability.
See id. § 1229a(c)(2)(A) (requiring noncitizens seeking admission to establish that he or she is
“clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted”).
67. The INA has a list of several “aggravated felonies” containing “relating to” language
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Mellouli also seems to indicate that removal under Section
1227(a)(2)(B)(i) depends on the state and federal drug schedules at the
time of the noncitizen’s conviction, rather than at the time of arrest or
initiation of removal proceedings. 68
Lastly, adjudicators must grapple with the decision’s unaddressed
issues of divisibility and realistic probability. 69 Mellouli declined to
address divisibility because the government had not raised the issue.70
In contrast, the government raised a realistic probability analysis, but
the Court merely referenced Matter of Ferreira without further
consideration. 71 Thus, Mellouli may still permit use of this realistic
probability test. 72
Despite the decision’s unanswered issues, Mellouli shows the
mounting complexity of statutory interpretation in executing federal
removal. Yet, clarity seems vital for a swollen immigration system with
rising litigation and limited resources. 73 As such, whether the language
without an “as defined in” parenthetical. See, e.g., id. § 1101(a)(43)(K)(i) (an offense that relates
to the owning, controlling, managing, or supervising of a prostitution business); id.
§ 1101(a)(43)(Q) (an offense relating to a failure to appear for sentence); id. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (an
offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury, or bribery of a witness); id. § 1101(a)(43)(T)
(an offense relating to a failure to appear to answer to a felony).
68. Compare Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1988 (majority opinion) (explaining that Kansas had nine
substances not federally listed “[a]t the time of Mellouli’s conviction”), and id. at 1993 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (noting that “at the time of Mellouli’s conviction” three percent of Kansas’s
controlled substances were not federally listed), with Gousse v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir.
2003) (holding that changes to the federal schedules subsequent to the date of conviction for the
noncitizen are to be applied retroactively).
69. See, e.g., Madrigal-Barcenas v. Lynch, 797 F.3d 643 (9th Cir. 2015). On remand from the
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit held that while a drug paraphernalia crime may not
categorically be a removable crime, the BIA must consider applying the modified categorical
approach. Id. at 644–45.
70. Divisibility and a modified categorical analysis here would have failed to prove
removability since Mellouli’s conviction record did not identify Adderall as the controlled
substance. See supranotes 8–9, 25–26, and accompanying text; see also Mellouli v. Holder, 719
F.3d 995, 999 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Here, the Kansas statutes and the only documents reflecting his
Kansas conviction that may be considered in applying the modified categorical approach did not
identify a particular controlled substance.”).
71. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 21, at 39–40 n.6 (“This Court has explained that
there must be a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its
statute to conduct outside the definition of federal law . . . .”); see supra notes 11–12 and
accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Press Release, Human Rights First, TRAC Numbers Demonstrate Need for
Immigration Court Funding to Address Worsening Backlogs (Sept. 22, 2015) (covering a newly
released report showing that half a million cases are pending before the U.S. Immigration Courts
and characterizing the Immigration Courts as “overwhelmed and woefully under-resourced”); see
also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL REPORT: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS:
2013, at 6 fig.2 (2014) (showing the increase of removals between 2004–13), http://www.dhs.gov
/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf; David Noriega & Adolfo Flores,
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of conviction satisfies removal is an urgent, rapidly evolving question
the Court will continue to face. 74

Immigration Courts Could Lose a Third of Their Interpreters, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 5, 2015
1:19 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/davidnoriega/immigration-courts-could-lose-a-third-of-their
-interpreters#.cdO50mpG0D.
74. On November 3, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on whether a state arson
offense is removable conduct depending on the broadness of the phrase “described in” under 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012). See Torres v. Holder, 764 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding a New
York arson offense is a removable aggravated felony because the phrase “described in” does not
require exact state-federal matching), cert. granted sub nom. Torres v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2918
(2015).

